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A CRITIQUE OF HOBBY LOBBY AND THE SUPREME 
COURT’S HANDS-OFF APPROACH TO RELIGION 
Samuel J. Levine∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several decades, the United States Supreme Court has 
demonstrated an increasing refusal to engage in a close evaluation of the 
religious nature of Free Exercise and Establishment Clause1 claims, instead 
deferring to adherents’ characterizations of the substance and significance 
of a religious practice or belief.2  The Supreme Court’s hands-off approach, 
which it has justified on both constitutional and practical grounds, has 
 
 ©  2015 Samuel J. Levine.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and 
distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for educational purposes, so 
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review 
Online, and includes this provision in the copyright notice. 
 ∗  Professor of Law and Director of the Jewish Law Institute, Touro Law Center.  An 
earlier version of this Essay was presented at the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, 
Biotechnology, and Bioethics, 2015 Annual Conference: “Law, Religion, and Health in 
America,” at Harvard Law School.  I thank the conference organizers, Glenn Cohen and 
Holly Lynch, for inviting me to participate, and I thank the conference participants for 
helpful conversations.   
 1  U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
 2  See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 458 (1988) 
(stating that interpreting the propriety of certain religious beliefs puts the Court “in a role 
that [it was] never intended to play”); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) 
(refusing to assess the “proper interpretation of the Amish faith”); Thomas v. Review Bd., 
450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or 
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”); Serbian E. 
Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721 (1976) (noting the “error” of 
“delv[ing] into . . . church constitutional provisions”); Presbyterian Church v. Mary 
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 451 (1969) (refusing to 
“engage in the forbidden process of interpreting . . . church doctrine”); United States v. 
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) (avoiding the “forbidden domain” of evaluating religious 
doctrine).  See generally Symposium, The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to 
Religious Doctrine, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 793 (2009). 
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attracted considerable scholarly attention, producing a substantial and 
growing body of literature assessing and, at times, critiquing the Court’s 
approach.3 
 
 3  See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in 
American Indian Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 387 (2012); Christopher L. 
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Does It Matter What Religion Is?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
807 (2009); Richard W. Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine: What Are 
We Talking About?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 837 (2009) [hereinafter Garnett, A Hands-Off 
Approach to Religious Doctrine]; Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the 
State’s Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645 (2004) 
[hereinafter Garnett, Development of Religious Doctrine]; Richard W. Garnett, Religion and 
Group Rights: Are Churches (Just) like  the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 
515 (2007); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Towards a Defensible Free Exercise Doctrine, 68 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 925 (2000); Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a “Religious Question” 
Doctrine? Judicial Authority to Examine Religious Practices and Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 497 (2005); Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over 
Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843 (1998) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Religious 
Property]; Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off: When and About What, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
913 (2009) [hereinafter Greenawalt, Hands Off]; Michael A. Helfand, Between Law and 
Religion: Procedural Challenges to Religious Arbitration Awards, 90 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
141 (2015); Michael A. Helfand, Litigating Religion, 93 B.U. L. REV. 493 (2013) 
[hereinafter Helfand, Litigating Religion]; Michael A. Helfand & Barak D. Richman, The 
Challenge of Co-Religionist Commerce, 64 DUKE L.J. 769 (2015); Paul Horwitz, Act III of 
the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 973 (2012); Andrew Koppelman, The 
Troublesome Religious Roots of Religious Neutrality, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 865 (2009); 
Randy Lee, When a King Speaks of God; When God Speaks to a King: Faith, Politics, Tax 
Exempt Status, and the Constitution in the Clinton Administration, LAW  & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 391; Howard Lesnick, The Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist 
Society, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1469 (1998); Samuel J. Levine, Hosanna-Tabor and Supreme 
Court Precedent: An Analysis of the Ministerial Exception in the Context of the Supreme 
Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 120 
(2011) [hereinafter Levine, Hosanna-Tabor]; Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme 
Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious Practice and Belief, 25 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 85 (1997) [hereinafter Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off 
Approach]; Samuel J. Levine, The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach to Religious 
Doctrine: An Introduction, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 793 (2009) [hereinafter Levine, The 
Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach: An Introduction]; Christopher C. Lund, Rethinking 
the “Religious-Question” Doctrine, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 1013 (2014); Ira C. Lupu, Hobby 
Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions, 38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 35 
(2015); Edward C. Lyons, Causation and Complicity: The HHS Contraceptive Mandate and 
Asymmetrical Burdens on Free Exercise, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 229 (2013); William P. 
Marshall, Bad Statutes Make Bad Law: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 71 
[hereinafter Marshall, Bad Statutes]; William P. Marshall, Smith, Ballard, and the Religious 
Inquiry Exception to the Criminal Law, 44 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 239 (2011) [hereinafter 
Marshall, Religious Inquiry]; Bernadette Meyler, Commerce in Religion, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 887 (2009); Scott M. Noveck, The Promise and Problems of Treating Religious 
Freedom as Freedom of Association, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 745 (2010); Jeffrey Shulman, The 
Outrageous God: Emotional Distress, Tort Liability, and the Limits of Religious Advocacy, 
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 381 (2008); Alex Tallchief Skibine, Culture Talk or Culture War in 
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Although Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,4 is widely viewed as a 
landmark case on a number of grounds,5 an important but somewhat 
overlooked point of contention between the majority opinion and the 
primary dissenting opinion in Hobby Lobby revolves around the application 
of the hands-off approach.6  Specifically, writing for the majority, Justice 
Alito insisted that the Court must defer to the plaintiffs’ characterization of 
both the nature and the degree of the burden that would be placed on their 
religious exercise if they were required, under the Affordable Care Act 
 
Federal Indian Law?, 45 TULSA L. REV. 89 (2009); Priscilla J. Smith, Who Decides 
Conscience? RFRA’s Catch-22, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 727 (2014); Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 
97 VA. L. REV. 1111 (2011); Mayu Miyashita, Comment, City of Boerne v. Flores and Its 
Impact on Prisoners’ Religious Freedom, 25 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 519 
(1999); see also Nat′l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the U.S. Under the Hereditary 
Guardianship, Inc. v. Nat’l Spiritual Assembly of the Bahá’ís of the U.S., Inc., 628 F.3d 
837, 846 n.2 (7th Cir. 2010) (referring to “the so-called ‘hands-off’ doctrine in disputes over 
religious property”); Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir. 
2006) (referring to “[t]he ministerial exception, and the hands-off approach more 
generally”). 
 4  134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 5  See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of 
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015); Trevor Burrus, 
From Status to Contract to Status: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby and the Primitivism of Politics, 
9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 60 (2015); Leslie C. Griffin, Hobby Lobby: The Crafty Case that 
Threatens Women’s Rights and Religious Freedom, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 641 (2015); 
Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154 (2014); Jason Iuliano, Do 
Corporations Have Religious Beliefs?, 90 IND. L.J. 47 (2015); Lyman Johnson & David 
Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1 (2014); Lupu, supra note 3; 
Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience 
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015); Eric Rassbach, Is Hobby 
Lobby Really a Brave New World? Litigation Truths About Religious Exercise by For-Profit 
Organizations, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (2015); David B. Schwartz, The NLRA’s 
Religious Exemption in a Post-Hobby Lobby World: Current Status, Future Difficulties, 
and a Proposed Solution, 30 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227 (2015); Amy J. Sepinwall, 
Conscience and Complicity: Assessing Pleas for Religious Exemptions After Hobby Lobby, 
82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2496218; Amy J. 
Sepinwall, Corporate Piety and Impropriety: Hobby Lobby’s Extension of RFRA Rights to 
the For-Profit Corporation, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 173 (2015); Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. 
Siegel, Compelling Interests and Contraception, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1025 (2015); 
Symposium, Issues of Reproductive Rights: Life, Liberty & the Pursuit of Policy, 28 J.L. & 
HEALTH 1 (2015); Symposium, Religious Accommodation in the Age of Civil Rights, 38 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER vii (2015); Symposium, Religious Accommodation in the Age of Civil 
Rights, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (2015); Thad Eagles, Note, Free Exercise, Inc.: A New 
Framework for Adjudicating Corporate Religious Liberty Claims, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 
(2015). 
 6  For examples of scholarship that have discussed the relevance of the Court’s 
hands-off approach in the context of the Hobby Lobby case, see, for example, Lupu, supra 
note 3; Lyons, supra note 3; Marshall, Bad Statutes, supra note 3; Smith, supra note 3. 
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(ACA),7 to provide employees with health insurance that includes access to 
certain forms of contraception.8  According to Justice Alito, the hands-off 
approach precludes the Court from inquiring into the accuracy or 
plausibility of the plaintiffs’ contention that complying with the ACA 
would impose a substantial burden on their religious practice.9  Writing for 
the dissenters, Justice Ginsburg offered a sharply contrasting view, 
concluding that Court need not accept the plaintiffs’ assertion that 
providing such coverage would place a substantial burden on their exercise 
of religion.10  Instead, Justice Ginsburg concluded that Hobby Lobby’s 
connection to the use of contraceptives by its employees is too attenuated 
to trigger an exemption from the requirement that it provide such 
coverage.11 
A close look at the majority and dissenting opinions seems to suggest 
that Justice Alito and Justice Ginsburg both relied on a hands-off approach 
to religion, but at the same time they reached very different conclusions.  
The sharp differences between Justices Alito and Ginsburg may thus be a 
further indication that, in addition to its other drawbacks,12 the Court’s 
hands-off approach is unwise and unworkable on its own terms, as its 
 
 7  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 1001(5), 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
13(a)(4) (2012). 
 8  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2777–79 (2014). 
 9  See id. at 2778–79. 
 10  See id. at 2798–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 11  See id. at 2799. 
 12  See, e.g., Garnett, A Hands-Off Approach to Religious Doctrine, supra note 3 
(examining the scope of the hands-off approach); Garnett, Development of Religious 
Doctrine, supra note 3 (arguing that governments are necessarily interested in and involved 
with religious claims and content); Goldstein, supra note 3, at 501 (“[I]t is incoherent to 
speak of a general prohibition on judicial examination of religious questions.”); Greenawalt, 
Religious Property, supra note 3 (examining problems resulting from the Court’s hands-off 
approach to conflicts over religious property); Greenawalt, Hands Off, supra note 3, at 913 
(noting the breadth of issues affected by the Court’s hands-off approach); Helfand, 
Litigating Religion, supra note 3 (arguing that the Court’s hands-off approach may unjustly 
deprive litigants of a forum for adjudicating religious claims); Levine, Hosanna-Tabor, 
supra note 3 (examining Hosanna-Tabor as an opportunity for the Court to revise the hands-
off approach); Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra note 3, 
at 86 (arguing that the hands-off approach “may lead to a number of disturbing results, some 
of which have already evidenced themselves in Supreme Court decisions in both Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clause cases”); Levine, The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off 
Approach: An Introduction, supra note 3 (describing critiques of the hands-off approach); 
Lund, supra note 3 (arguing that religious-question cases often involve the kinds of 
temporal and empirical issues that courts typically adjudicate); Marshall, Religious Inquiry, 
supra note 3 (describing difficulties with the hands-off approach when considered in the 
context of the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence); Smith, supra note 3 (arguing that 
the Court’s hands-off approach will lead to inconsistent outcomes in religious exercise 
cases).  
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meaning and application remain far from clear.  Moreover, the continued 
implementation of a hands-off approach will be particularly challenging 
with the increasing emergence of new health care technologies and the 
continuing diversity of religious practice in the United States.  Thus, as 
Hobby Lobby demonstrates, rather than providing a mechanism for judges 
to resolve cases involving complex issues of law and religion, the hands-off 
approach serves to exacerbate the difficulties and differences that divide 
judges in adjudicating religious claims. 
Part I of this Essay provides a brief overview for analyzing the 
Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to religious doctrine.  Specifically, 
this Part presents a summary of problems posed by the hands-off approach, 
followed by a brief taxonomy of different forms of judicial inquiry into 
religion.  This Part aims to clarify which forms of inquiry are permissible—
and typically necessary—for adjudication of a case involving a religious 
claim, and which forms of inquiry are precluded under the hands-off 
doctrine.  Part II of this Essay applies the hands-off framework to the 
Hobby Lobby decision, considering the taxonomy of forms of judicial 
inquiry into religion in the context of both Justice Alito’s majority opinion 
and Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion.  This Part finds that while 
Justice Alito closely followed Supreme Court precedent regarding the 
hands-off doctrine, Justice Ginsburg seems to have departed significantly 
from central aspects of the Court’s previous decisions. 
Accordingly, Part III of this Essay takes a closer look at Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissenting opinion, finding that her analysis may suggest a 
reformulated hands-off approach that, in some ways, extends the degree of 
deference afforded to the claims of religious adherents.  Specifically, 
Justice Ginsburg seems to revive the view of Justice Robert Jackson, who 
argued, in a 1944 dissenting opinion, that judges should not question the 
sincerity of a religious claim.13  At the same time, however, Justice 
Ginsburg’s approach likewise departs from Supreme Court precedent in 
allowing judges to question a claimant’s characterization of a law or 
regulation as placing a substantial burden on the claimant’s religious 
exercise.  As a result, Justice Ginsburg’s approach would appear to place 
additional limitations on the exercise of religious freedoms, beyond those 
presented by the Court’s current hands-off approach.  Thus, building on my 
previous work critiquing the Court’s hands-off approach,14 this Essay calls 
upon the Court to reassess and rethink the scope and contours of the hands-
off approach, both to remedy the problems inherent in the current approach 
and to prevent the additional concerns raised by the opinions in Hobby 
Lobby. 
 
 13  See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 14  See Levine, Hosanna-Tabor, supra note 3; Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s 
Hands-Off Approach, supra note 3; Levine, The Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach: An 
Introduction, supra note 3.   
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I.     THE SUPREME COURT’S HANDS-OFF APPROACH  
TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICE AND BELIEF: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Over the course of developing its Religion Clause jurisprudence, the 
Supreme Court has adopted and expanded a hands-off approach to 
evaluating religious practice and belief.  Relying on principles grounded in 
conceptions of both constitutional law and the role of judges, the Court has 
proscribed judicial determination of a wide range of questions related to 
religious doctrine.15  Notwithstanding some of the sound policy 
considerations underlying the Supreme Court’s attempts to prevent judges 
from evaluating the substance of religious doctrine, the Court’s hands-off 
approach produces additional problems of its own. 
First, as an analytical matter, the precise contours and application of 
the Court’s hands-off approach raise a variety of both descriptive and 
normative issues.16  Second, as a practical matter, requiring that judges 
defer to a religious claimant’s characterizations of the nature of a religious 
claim may have the effect of broadening the range of religious rights in a 
way that proves unworkable for the government, courts, and society as a 
whole.17  Conversely, as a corollary to this problem, religious adherents 
who, under the hands-off approach, are granted broad religious freedoms, 
may face a backlash among the government, judges, and the public, 
resulting in the imposition of significant limitations on the range of claims 
recognized as worthy of constitutional or statutory protection.18 
This dynamic seems to have led directly to the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in the 1990 case, Employment Division v. Smith,19 which 
sharply curtailed the reach of Free Exercise protections.20  The Smith case 
prompted Congress to enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
 
 15  See supra note 2. 
 16  See sources cited supra note 12. 
 17  See Goldstein, supra note 3, at 502, 525–33 (arguing that “contrary to the Court’s 
language, an absolute prohibition on judicial examination of religious questions is neither 
possible nor advisable”); Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach, 
supra note 3, at 92–123 (collecting Free Exercise cases and examining the effects of the 
Court’s hands-off approach); Marshall, Religious Inquiry, supra note 3, at 251. 
 18  See Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra note 3, at 
134. 
 19  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 20  See Greenawalt, Religious Property, supra note 3, at 1906 (stating that the “major 
basis for the decision [in Employment Division v. Smith] is that courts should not have to 
assess religious understandings and the strength of religious feeling in order to decide if the 
religious claim is strong enough to warrant an exemption”); Levine, Rethinking the Supreme 
Court’s Hands-Off Approach, supra note 3, at 88 (“[T]he Court’s decision in Employment 
Division v. Smith was, in part, a result of the Court’s increasing reluctance to decide 
questions involving religious interpretation.”); Marshall, Religious Inquiry, supra note 3, at 
255 n.124. 
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(RFRA),21 which the Court, in turn, declared unconstitutional as applied to 
state laws,22 further prompting Congress to enact the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).23  The proper interpretation 
and application of these statutes remain the subject of considerable debate 
and confusion.24 
 
 21  See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418, 429–30 (2006) (“Here the burden is placed squarely on the Government by RFRA 
rather than the First Amendment, but the consequences are the same.  Congress’s express 
decision to legislate the compelling interest test indicates that RFRA challenges should be 
adjudicated in the same manner as constitutionally mandated applications of the test . . . .” 
(citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(b), 2000bb-2(3))).  The text of RFRA provides, in relevant 
part:  
(a) In general  
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion 
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as 
provided in subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) Exception 
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if 
it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2012). 
 22  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 23  See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60 (2015).  The text of RLUIPA provides, 
in relevant part: 
(a) General rule 
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of 
a person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 1997 
of this title, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, 
unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that 
person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest. 
(b) Scope of application 
This section applies in any case in which— 
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that 
receives Federal financial assistance; or 
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden 
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, 
or with Indian tribes. 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a)–(b). 
 24  See, e.g., Daniel P. Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: The Overbroad Applications 
and Troubling Implications of RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 805, 
806, 834–36 (2006); Robin Fretwell Wilson, When Governments Insulate Dissenters from 
Social Change: What Hobby Lobby and Abortion Conscience Clauses Teach About Specific 
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The contentious nature of these statutes arguably stems, in part, from 
more general confusion over the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach and 
may likewise account, in part, for the debate and confusion among the 
Justices in Hobby Lobby.  After all, the necessity to adjudicate cases under 
the Religion Clauses, as well as under RFRA, RLUIPA, and state 
RFRAs,25 requires consideration of religious claims, and thus, at times, 
may entail careful judicial examination of the substance and nature of 
religious doctrine.  The challenge of reconciling the dual goals of 
adjudicating cases involving religion and maintaining appropriate 
deference to the beliefs of religious adherents stands at the center of the 
dispute among the Justices in Hobby Lobby.  In an effort to clarify these 
issues, it may be helpful first to identify different categories of inquiry that 
arise in the course of adjudicating Religion Clause cases, and to explore 
Supreme Court precedent with respect to each category.26 
The following analysis will consider a brief taxonomy of four related 
but conceptually distinct forms of inquiry that may arise in the context of 
adjudicating a religious claim.  The analysis will apply each of these 
questions to a hypothetical religious claim: An inmate in federal prison 
claims to belong to the Church of the One True Religion (COTR), requiring 
adherents to have a meal with steak and sherry every Friday afternoon.  
Another inmate, in the same prison, also claims to belong to the Church of 
 
Exemptions, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 703, 714 (2014) (“[T]he public is unable to predict how 
courts will apply RFRA to particular disputes, causing confusion about when a legal duty 
applies to a religious believer and when it does not . . . .”); Eric D. Yordy, Fixing Free 
Exercise: A Compelling Need to Relieve the Current Burdens, 36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
191 (2008); Jonathan Knapp, Note, Making Snow in the Desert: Defining a Substantial 
Burden Under RFRA, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 259, 278–92 (2009) (“RFRA and RLUIPA: 
Conflict and Confusion Abound . . .”); Tokufumi Noda, Note, The Role of Economics in the 
Discourse on RLUIPA and Nondiscrimination in Religious Land Use, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 
1093 (2012) (noting the “confusion as to how to apply RLUIPA consistently”); Jaron A. 
Robinson, Comment, Land, Libations, and Liberty: RLUIPA and the Specter of Liquor 
Control Laws, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 157, 159 (2012) (“[S]ince its passage in 2000, RLUIPA has 
generated confusion among the federal courts of appeals.”); Emily Urch, Comment, Shields 
and Kirpans: How RFRA Promotes “Irrational-Basis” Review as For-Profit Companies 
Challenge the Affordable Care Act’s Women’s Health Amendment, 39 U. DAYTON L. REV. 
173, 198 (2013) (“Since the Supreme Court has not defined what amounts to a ‘substantial 
burden’ when analyzing a RFRA claim, confusion is bound to continue.”). 
 25  See Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State 
RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010); James W. Wright, Jr., Note, Making State Religious 
Freedom Restoration Amendments Effective, 61 ALA. L. REV. 425 (2010); State Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 5, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx. 
 26  It should be noted that, although the Court developed the hands-off approach in the 
context of interpreting the Free Exercise Clause, both the majority and dissent in Hobby 
Lobby applied the hands-off approach—albeit in different ways—in the context of the 
statutory interpretation of RFRA and RLUIPA as well. 
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the One True Religion, but asserts that adherents to the COTR are 
prohibited from having either steak or sherry, and are instead required to 
have a Friday afternoon meal consisting of brie and chardonnay.27 
1.   Sincerity of a Religious Claim 
By definition, the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA, and RLUIPA apply 
only to claims that are premised upon religious practice or belief.  Although 
the Court has never mapped out the precise elements necessary for a 
system of belief to qualify as a religion,28 as a threshold matter, a court 
must first conclude that a religious claim is sincere before affording Free 
Exercise, RFRA, or RLUIPA protections to the claimant.  Thus, if a court 
determines, as a factual matter, that a claimant is not sincere in basing a 
 
 27  This hypothetical is based on modified facts from actual cases involving the 
Church of the New Song.  See, e.g., Church of the New Song v. Establishment of Religion 
on Taxpayers’ Money in the Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 620 F.2d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 1980); 
Remmers v. Brewer, 494 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Theriault v. Carlson, 339 
F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Ga. 1972), vacated, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 28  See, e.g., Andrew W. Austin, Faith and the Constitutional Definition of Religion, 
22 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1991); Barbra Barnett, Twentieth Century Approaches to Defining 
Religion: Clifford Geertz and the First Amendment, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER 
& CLASS 93, 131–38 (2007); A. Stephen Boyan, Jr., Defining Religion in Operational and 
Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479 (1968); Jesse H. Choper, Defining “Religion” in 
the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 587–91; James M. Donovan, God is as God 
Does: Law, Anthropology, and the Definition of “Religion,” 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23, 
29–70 (1995); Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 3, at 812–16, 834; George C. Freeman, III, 
The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of “Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519, 
1524–28 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. 
L. REV. 753, 759–61 (1984); John O. Hayward, Religious Pretenders in the Courts: 
Unmasking the Imposters, TRINITY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), 
http://works.bepress.com/john_hayward/15/; Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A 
Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233 (1989); John C. 
Knechtle, If We Don’t Know What It Is, How Do We Know If It’s Established?, 41 
BRANDEIS L.J. 521 (2003); L. Scott Smith, Constitutional Meanings of “Religion” Past and 
Present: Explorations in Definition and Theory, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 89, 91–
103 (2004); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion Under 
the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other Disciplines of Study 
Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. REV. 
123, 123–88 (2007); Ben Clements, Note, Defining “Religion” in the First Amendment: A 
Functional Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532, 536–39 (1989); Timothy L. Hall, Note, The 
Sacred and the Profane: A First Amendment Definition of Religion, 61 TEX. L. REV. 139, 
141–52 (1982); Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note, Constitutional “Religion”: A Survey of First 
Amendment Definitions of Religion, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117, 125–37 (2001); Eduardo 
Peñalver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 795–99 (1997); Note, Toward 
a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1057–66 (1978).  
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claim in a religious practice or belief, the court will not apply these 
protections.29 
Applied to the case of inmates who claim to require particular 
religious diets based on the asserted beliefs of the COTR, a court would 
have to undertake a threshold determination of the factual sincerity of each 
inmate’s assertion.30  Similar to other forms of factual inquiry, the court 
would weigh the available evidence, including such factors as whether the 
inmate has adhered to this religion and this diet in the past, whether the 
religion has other adherents, and whether the inmate might have ulterior 
motives for the claim.  Although none of these factors would, by itself, 
necessarily prove to be dispositive, together, these and other considerations 
will provide the grounds for the court’s factual findings.  If, on the basis of 
these findings, the court concludes that the inmate sincerely adheres to a 
religion with practices that include the specified diet, the inmate’s claim 
will qualify for legal protections as an exercise of religion.31 
2.   Metaphysical Truth of a Religious Claim 
Although courts may—presumably must—evaluate the sincerity of a 
religious claim before applying the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA, or 
RLUIPA, courts are precluded from evaluating the metaphysical truth of a 
religious claim.  As the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained, as a basic 
tenet of the Court’s hands-off approach to religious doctrine, the American 
legal system does not recognize or reject the metaphysical truth or validity 
of a particular religion or religious belief.32  
 
 29  See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 84 (1944); see also John T. 
Noonan, Jr., How Sincere Do You Have to Be to Be Religious?, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 713 
(describing the Court’s approach in Ballard); Kent Greenawalt, Book Review, 70 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1133 (1970) (reviewing MILTON R. KONVITZ, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE: 
A CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY (1968)); Ben Adams & Cynthia Barmore, Essay, Questioning 
Sincerity: The Role of the Courts After Hobby Lobby, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 59 (2014) 
(arguing that courts use objective criteria to inquire into the sincerity of religious beliefs); 
Kevin L. Brady, Comment, Religious Sincerity and Imperfection: Can Lapsing Prisoners 
Recover Under RFRA and RLUIPA?, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1431 (2011) (arguing that sincerity 
of religious beliefs is the determinative inquiry for claims by prisoners who fail to take 
advantage of religious accommodations).   
 30  See Brady, supra note 29, at 1442–63. 
 31  See, e.g., Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 862 (2015) (“[O]f course, a prisoner’s 
request for an accommodation must be sincerely based on a religious belief and not some 
other motivation.” (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2774 n.28 
(2014))). 
 32  See, e.g., Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (“Repeatedly and in many 
different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a 
particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.”); United States v. Lee, 
455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (refusing to assess the “proper interpretation of the Amish faith”); 
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be 
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Applied to the COTR, an inmate’s claim to require a Friday afternoon 
meal of steak and sherry or brie and chardonnay may appear to most 
observers to be highly unusual, if not downright suspect.  Indeed, a court 
might find, on the basis of evidence presented, that as a factual matter, the 
inmate is not sincere in this claim, but instead is fabricating a religious 
belief as a pretext to try to compel prison authorities to provide a meal well 
beyond the quality ordinarily available as part of a prison diet.  
Nevertheless, to the extent that a court finds the inmate to be sincere in the 
claimed adherence to a religion that requires or expects its adherents to 
partake of such a meal, the court has no authority to reject the claim on the 
grounds that it seems to represent an unlikely or even bizarre form of 
religious practice. 
3.   Accuracy or Consistency of a Religious Claim 
A similar but somewhat more expansive form of the Court’s hands-off 
approach involves a scenario in which individuals who claim to adhere to 
the same religion assert different views of that religion’s beliefs or 
practices.  In such scenarios, the Supreme Court has likewise repeatedly 
emphasized that judges have no role in adjudicating intrafaith differences 
of belief, whether they relate to property disputes, personnel issues, or 
other matters of doctrine.33  
 
acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First 
Amendment protection.”); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872) (“The law 
knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no 
sect.”).  In Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), the Court 
elaborated: 
This Court cannot determine the truth of the underlying beliefs that led to the 
religious objections here or in Roy, and accordingly cannot weigh the adverse 
effects on the appellees in Roy and compare them with the adverse effects on the 
Indian respondents.  Without the ability to make such comparisons, we cannot say 
that the one form of incidental interference with an individual’s spiritual activities 
should be subjected to a different constitutional analysis than the other.  
Id. at 449–50 (citing Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 n.9 
(1987)).  In Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, the Court also stated:  
Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. . . . The religious views espoused by 
respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people.  But if 
those doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or 
falsity, then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect.  When the 
triers of fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain.  The First 
Amendment does not select any one group or any one type of religion for 
preferred treatment.  It puts them all in that position. 
Id. at 86–87. 
 33  See, e.g., Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 863 (“[T]he protection of RLUIPA, no less than the 
guarantee of the Free Exercise Clause, is ‘not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of 
the members of a religious sect.’” (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715–16); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 
457–58 (“[T]he dissent’s approach would require us to rule that some religious adherents 
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It should be emphasized that the issue of accuracy or consistency, like 
the question of metaphysical truth, is conceptually distinct from the issue of 
sincerity.  For example, a sincerely asserted claim would qualify as 
religious in nature even if the claim appears mistaken or irrational in the 
view of others, including other adherents to the same religion.  Conversely, 
as a threshold matter, a claim would fail if the plaintiff were insincere, even 
if others consider the claim to be an accurate, plausible, or eminently 
rational religious belief. 
To be sure, there remains a degree of complexity—and potentially, 
confusion—within the Court’s hands-off approach in the context of these 
questions.  In practice, courts and others may find it difficult to 
disaggregate the issue of sincerity from issues of metaphysical truth or 
accuracy, and may tend to question a claimant’s sincerity if, in the eyes of 
the beholder, including the eyes of other adherents to the same religion, the 
claimant’s belief seems mistaken, insubstantial, or irrational. 
 
misunderstand their own religious beliefs.  We think such an approach cannot be squared 
with the Constitution or with our precedents, and that it would cast the Judiciary in a role 
that we were never intended to play.”); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 
U.S. 696, 721 (1976) (noting the “error” of “delv[ing] into . . . church constitutional 
provisions”).  In Thomas, 450 U.S. 707, the Court stated: 
Intrafaith differences of that kind are not uncommon among followers of a 
particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such 
differences in relation to the Religion Clauses. . . . [T]he guarantee of free exercise 
is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect.  
Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial function and judicial 
competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly 
perceived the commands of their common faith.  Courts are not arbiters of 
scriptural interpretation. 
450 U.S. at 715–16.  Also, in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l 
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), the Court further elaborated on the role of the 
courts: 
First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is 
made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious 
doctrine and practice.  If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in 
order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting 
the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in 
matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. . . . [T]he Amendment therefore 
commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving 
underlying controversies over religious doctrine. . . . The Georgia courts have 
violated the command of the First Amendment . . . . [T]he departure-from-doctrine 
element . . . requires the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a 
religion—the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of 
those doctrines to the religion.  Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts 
from playing such a role. . . . To reach those questions would require the civil 
courts to engage in the forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church 
doctrine. 
Id. at 449–51. 
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Nevertheless, once a court has found that a religious adherent is 
sincere in asserting a claim as religious in nature, the court must afford 
Free Exercise, RFRA, or RLUIPA protections, regardless of how 
unpopular, unusual, or even bizarre the belief may appear in the view of 
outside observers, including the judge adjudicating the case, the public, or 
others.  Accordingly, the Court has held that for the purposes of Free 
Exercise protection, the validity of an adherent’s religious claim does not 
turn on whether other adherents share a similar belief.  Instead, the 
claimant has the autonomy and authority to maintain an individualistic 
form of belief, entitled to protection as religious in nature, independent of 
whether the belief is shared—or repudiated—by others asserting adherence 
to the same religion. 
In the context of the COTR, the two inmates have very different views 
of the diet their religion requires for a Friday afternoon meal.  Indeed, their 
views are not only inconsistent with one another but incompatible, such 
that one inmate’s asserted compliance with a requirement of the COTR 
would, according to the other inmate, constitute a violation of COTR 
doctrine.  Once again, as a factual matter, in theory, a court might find 
one—or both—of the inmates to be insincere in asserting a particular form 
of belief.  For example, in addition to general concerns that inmates might 
try to use insincere religious claims as a pretext to obtain special meals, 
perhaps the court will find that one or more of these inmates has the 
ulterior motive of sabotaging the other inmate’s efforts to obtain a preferred 
meal or, more broadly, of undermining the other inmate’s interests or 
credibility.  Otherwise, under the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach, to 
the extent that the court finds both inmates to be sincere in their beliefs, 
both are entitled to Free Exercise protections—even though the two forms 
of conduct are in conflict with each other and are asserted as being 
requested and required pursuant to the same religion. 
4.   Substantial Burden/Compelling Governmental Interest 
RFRA provides that “Government may substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the 
burden to the person . . . is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and . . . is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.”34  RLUIPA consists of similar provisions, applied 
in the context of land use and prisons.35 
Under the terms of these statutes and pursuant to Supreme Court 
precedent, judges have the authority to evaluate whether the government’s 
restriction on religion stands as the least restrictive means of furthering a 
 
 34  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012). 
 35  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b). 
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compelling governmental interest.36  Is it less clear, however, whether the 
Court’s hands-off approach to religion mandates not only that judges 
accept a religious adherent’s sincere claim that a law burdens the exercise 
of religion, but also that judges defer to the adherent’s characterization of 
the burden as substantial, thereby triggering the balancing tests in RFRA 
and RLUIPA.  To be sure, the Court has declared that judges are precluded 
from determining the centrality of a practice or belief within a religious 
system,37 but it has not ruled on whether this deference extends to the 
designation of a religious burden as substantial.38 
The distinction may prove significant in the context of the COTR if 
the inmates claim that the prison’s failure to provide their respective diets, 
of sherry and steak or brie and chardonnay, would work a substantial 
 
 36  See, e.g., Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418, 429 (2006); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 37  See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), in which the Court 
stated: 
Nor is it possible to limit the impact of respondents’ proposal by requiring a 
“compelling state interest” only when the conduct prohibited is “central” to the 
individual’s religion.  It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the 
“centrality” of religious beliefs before applying a “compelling interest” test in the 
free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the “importance” of 
ideas before applying the “compelling interest” test in the free speech field.  What 
principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion 
that a particular act is “central” to his personal faith?  Judging the centrality of 
different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable “business of evaluating the 
relative merits of differing religious claims.”  As we reaffirmed only last Term, 
“[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or 
practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of those 
creeds.”  Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts 
must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the 
plausibility of a religious claim. 
Id. at 886–87 (alteration in original) (first quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., 
concurring); then quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)) (first citing 
Lyng, 485 U.S. at 474–76 (Brennan, J., dissenting); then citing Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716; 
then citing Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 450; then citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 
602–06 (1979); and then citing Ballard, 322 U.S. at 85–87).  In Lyng, the Court stated: 
We would accordingly be required to weigh the value of every religious belief and 
practice that is said to be threatened by any government program. . . . [This] offers 
us the prospect of this Court’s holding that some sincerely held religious beliefs 
and practices are not “central” to certain religions, despite protestations to the 
contrary from the religious objectors who brought the lawsuit.  In other words, the 
dissent’s approach would require us to rule that some religious adherents 
misunderstand their own religious beliefs.  We think such an approach cannot be 
squared with the Constitution or with our precedents, and that it would cast the 
Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play. 
485 U.S. at 457–58 (internal citations omitted). 
 38  See, e.g., Lupu, supra note 3, at 80–82. 
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burden on their religious exercise.  If courts have the authority to evaluate 
whether a burden is substantial, a judge might engage in various forms of 
inquiry before requiring that the government satisfy the least 
restrictive/compelling interest standard.  For example: a judge might look 
to whether the inmate engages in other forms of religious exercise, 
including a religious diet, throughout the rest of the week; a judge might 
find that the prison can substitute similar foods for those requested by the 
inmate; or a judge might order prison officials to provide the requested diet 
but only if the inmate pays for the additional costs involved. 
If, however, the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach precludes judges 
from inquiring into the nature of a law’s effect on religion, a court would 
presumably have to accept the inmate’s assertion that the prison’s failure to 
provide the requested meal resulted in a substantial burden on the inmate’s 
exercise of religion.  In turn, the government would have to provide the 
meal, as requested, unless it can show that refusal to do so represents the 
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. 
II.     APPLYING THE HANDS-OFF APPROACH TO HOBBY LOBBY 
In an effort to understand and clarify some of the precise points of 
contention between Justice Alito’s majority opinion and Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissenting opinion in Hobby Lobby, it might prove instructive to consider 
each opinion in light of the four forms of inquiry, outlined above, that 
compose Supreme Court precedent with respect to evaluating questions of 
religious practice and belief. 
A.   Justice Alito’s Majority Opinion 
The majority opinion in Hobby Lobby, authored by Justice Alito, 
relies heavily on the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to questions of 
religious doctrine.  Indeed, the majority’s formulation of the facts of the 
case fits squarely within the Court’s deferential approach to religious 
adherents’ characterizations of the nature of religious claims: “The Hahns 
and Greens believe that providing the coverage demanded by the HHS 
[Health and Human Services] regulations is connected to the destruction of 
an embryo in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to 
provide the coverage.”39  Accordingly, the majority applied Supreme Court 
precedent to conclude that the HHS regulations violated the plaintiffs’ 
religious rights under RFRA.40  In fact, Justice Alito’s opinion provides a 
somewhat systematic application of the Court’s hands-off approach in the 
context of different forms of judicial inquiry into religious claims. 
 
 39  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2778 (2014). 
 40  Id. at 2785. 
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1.   Sincerity of a Religious Claim 
Addressing the threshold question of the sincerity of the plaintiffs’ 
religious claim, the majority noted that: 
[T]he Hahns and Greens have a sincere religious belief that life begins 
at conception.  They therefore object on religious grounds to providing 
health insurance that covers methods of birth control that, as HHS 
acknowledges, may result in the destruction of an embryo.  By requiring 
the Hahns and Greens and their companies to arrange for such coverage, 
the HHS mandate demands that they engage in conduct that seriously 
violates their religious beliefs.41 
As the opinion further observed, “the plaintiffs . . . assert that funding 
the specific contraceptive methods at issue violates their religious beliefs, 
and HHS does not question their sincerity.”42  Thus, under Supreme Court 
precedent, the factual determination of the sincerity of the plaintiffs’ 
religious beliefs would prove sufficient to satisfy the legal determination 
that the plaintiffs’ claim is religious in nature.43 
2/3.   Metaphysical Truth/Accuracy and Consistency of a Religious Claim 
Having accepted the sincerity of the plaintiffs’ claim, the majority 
applied well-settled elements of the hands-off approach to reject any 
argument that, in abiding by the HHS regulations, the plaintiffs would not, 
in fact, violate their religious beliefs.  As the opinion put it: 
[T]he Hahns and Greens and their companies sincerely believe that 
providing the insurance coverage demanded by the HHS regulations lies 
on the forbidden side of the line, and it is not for us to say that their 
religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial.  Instead, our “narrow 
function . . . in this context is to determine” whether the line drawn 
reflects “an honest conviction,” and there is no dispute that it does.44 
Indeed, the majority noted, the claimants’ belief “implicates a difficult 
and important question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the 
circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is 
innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the 
commission of an immoral act by another.”45  Thus, according to the 
majority, “[a]rrogating the authority to provide a binding national answer to 
this religious and philosophical question” would “in effect tell the plaintiffs 
 
 41  Id. at 2775 (citing Brief for the Petitioners at 9 n.4, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 173486, at *9 n.4). 
 42  Id. at 2779. 
 43  See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
 44  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 
716 (1981)). 
 45  Id. at 2778. 
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that their beliefs are flawed.”46  Not surprisingly, therefore, affirming basic 
principles set forth as part of the Court’s hands-off approach, the majority 
declared that “[f]or good reason, we have repeatedly refused to take such a 
step.”47 
4.   Substantial Burden/Compelling Governmental Interest 
After thereby accepting both the sincerity and the substance of the 
plaintiffs’ religious claim, the majority turned to the provisions of RFRA, 
which prohibit the government from placing a substantial burden on the 
exercise of religion unless necessary as the least restrictive means of 
furthering a compelling governmental interest.48  The majority found that, 
“[b]ecause the contraceptive mandate forces them to pay an enormous sum 
of money—as much as $475 million per year in the case of Hobby 
Lobby—if they insist on providing insurance coverage in accordance with 
their religious beliefs, the mandate clearly imposes a substantial burden on 
those beliefs.”49  Finally, the majority concluded50—as Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence further elaborated51—that the restriction did not constitute the 
least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. 
B.   Justice Ginsburg’s Dissenting Opinion 
While Justice Alito’s majority opinion provided a fairly systematic—
if not somewhat formalistic52—application of the different categories of 
judicial inquiry into questions of religious practice and belief, in a manner 
largely consistent with Supreme Court precedent, Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissenting opinion focused, in part, on broader policy considerations.  In so 
doing, the opinion may reflect the dissenters’ more general concerns 
about—and potential objections to—aspects of Supreme Court precedent in 
this area, including elements of the Court’s hands-off approach to questions 
of religious doctrine. 
 
 46  Id. 
 47  Id. (citing Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (“Repeatedly and in 
many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine . . . the 
plausibility of a religious claim.”); see Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989); 
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 
440, 450 (1969)).   
 48  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012). 
 49  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 50  Id. at 2779–85. 
 51  Id. at 2785–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 52  See Kent Greenawalt, The Hobby Lobby Case: Controversial Interpretive 
Techniques and Standards of Application 4–5 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 14-421, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2512906. 
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1.   Sincerity of a Religious Claim 
In responding to the majority’s analysis, Justice Ginsburg first 
asserted that “I agree with the Court that the Green and Hahn families’ 
religious convictions regarding contraception are sincerely held.”53  As 
such, consistent with the Court’s hands-off approach to questions of 
religious doctrine, Justice Ginsburg might have been expected to likewise 
accept the plaintiffs’ claims that following the mandate would entail a 
violation of their religious beliefs and, accordingly, that the law placed a 
substantial burden on their exercise of religion. 
2/3.   Metaphysical Truth/Accuracy and Consistency of a Religious Claim 
Indeed, again like the majority, Justice Ginsburg cited Supreme Court 
precedent for the proposition that “courts are not to question where an 
individual ‘dr[aws] the line’ in defining which practices run afoul of her 
religious beliefs.”54  Having thus declared the need for judicial deference to 
the plaintiffs’ characterizations of their religious obligations, the dissent 
appeared poised to likewise adopt and apply the Court’s hands-off 
approach in the context of the plaintiffs’ claim that adhering to the HHS 
regulation would work a substantial burden on their exercise of religion. 
4.   Substantial Burden/Compelling Governmental Interest 
Somewhat surprisingly, however, Justice Ginsburg instead proceeded 
to question whether the law placed a substantial burden on the plaintiffs’ 
religious exercise.55  Justice Ginsburg declared that the plaintiffs’ beliefs, 
however deeply held, do not suffice to sustain a RFRA claim.  RFRA, 
properly understood, distinguishes between “factual allegations that 
[plaintiffs’] beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature,” which a court 
must accept as true, and the “legal conclusion . . . that [plaintiffs’] 
religious exercise is substantially burdened,” an inquiry the court must 
undertake.56 
Whatever the merits of this distinction, Justice Ginsburg’s ensuing 
evaluation of the plaintiffs’ claim comes perilously close to—and, 
according to the majority, crosses the line into—the kind of judicial inquiry 
precluded by the Court’s hands-off approach.57 
 
 53  Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 
715 (1981)). 
 54  Id. at 2798 (alteration in original) (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715). 
 55  Id. at 2798. 
 56  Id. at 2798 (alterations in original) (quoting Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 
679 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 
 57  See id. at 2778 n.35 (majority opinion) (“The principal dissent makes no effort to 
reconcile its view about the substantial-burden requirement with our decision in Thomas.”); 
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Indeed, Justice Ginsburg expressly rejected the applicability of the 
hands-off approach to the question of whether the plaintiffs faced a 
substantial burden on their religion.  Instead, “[u]ndertaking the inquiry 
that the Court forgoes,” Justice Ginsburg “conclude[d] that the connection 
between the families’ religious objections and the contraceptive coverage 
requirement is too attenuated to rank as substantial.”58  Specifically, she 
wrote, “[a]ny decision to use contraceptives made by a woman covered 
under Hobby Lobby’s or Conestoga’s plan will not be propelled by the 
Government, it will be the woman’s autonomous choice, informed by the 
physician she consults.”59 
Finally, and again somewhat surprisingly, Justice Ginsburg critiqued 
not only the majority’s conclusion, but the methodology it employed in 
applying the least restrictive/compelling governmental interest test required 
under the provisions of RFRA.60  In particular, Justice Ginsburg raised a 
number of largely hypothetical scenarios in which, she was concerned, the 
majority’s approach would require the government to demonstrate that a 
law was the least restrictive means for furthering a compelling 
governmental interest, and in turn, would require individualized judicial 
consideration of each of these cases.61  Rejecting the response that “each 
one of these cases . . . would have to be evaluated on its own . . . apply[ing] 
the compelling interest-least restrictive alternative test,”62 Justice Ginsburg 
 
see also Lupu, supra note 3, at 82 (“The [Hobby Lobby] majority preferred the Thomas rule 
of judicial abstention; [Justice Ginsburg’s] dissent preferred active judicial involvement in 
the question of the religious substantiality of the burden.”); Lyons, supra note 3, at 262 
(“[T]he legal guidance that does exist explicitly discourages courts from entering into the 
various types of considerations that might otherwise be thought relevant [to the substantial-
burden issue].”); Marshall, Bad Statutes, supra note 3, at 113–16 (examining “Justice 
Alito’s decision to construe RFRA in a way that avoids the need for courts to inquire into 
burden”); Smith, supra note 3, at 748 (noting that Establishment Clause principles preclude 
judicial inquiries into “the ‘substantiality’ of a burden on religious exercise” and “the 
‘centrality’ of a practice to religious belief”). 
 58  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 59  Id. 
 60  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(b) (2012). 
 61  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Would the exemption 
the Court holds RFRA demands for employers with religiously grounded objections to the 
use of certain contraceptives extend to employers with religiously grounded objections to 
blood transfusions (Jehovah’s Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications 
derived from pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin 
(certain Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among 
others)?”). 
 62  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 6, Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-354_3ebh.pdf). 
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argued that an application of RFRA that entailed such a judicial 
undertaking would constitute an “immoderate reading of RFRA.”63 
III.     ANOTHER LOOK AT JUSTICE GINSBURG’S DISSENT:  
A REFORMULATED HANDS-OFF APPROACH? 
A closer look at Justice Ginsburg’s opinion may suggest a 
reformulation of the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to questions of 
religious practice and belief.  As the majority noted in Hobby Lobby, in 
apparent contrast to Supreme Court precedent, Justice Ginsburg seems 
willing to allow—or require—a degree of judicial inquiry into the accuracy 
of a religious adherent’s claim, to the extent that such inquiry is relevant to 
the determination of whether the government has placed a substantial 
burden on the adherent’s exercise of religion.64  At the same time, as she 
put it near the end of her dissent, Justice Ginsburg sees “an overriding 
interest . . . in keeping the courts ‘out of the business of evaluating’ . . . the 
sincerity with which an asserted religious belief is held.”65  Thus, again in 
contrast to Supreme Court precedent, Justice Ginsburg seems to promote a 
hands-off approach that would disfavor judicial evaluation of the sincerity 
of an adherent’s asserted religious belief.66 
Justice Ginsburg’s apparent reformulation of Supreme Court 
precedent may account, in part, for the impression that the majority and 
dissenting opinions in Hobby Lobby are talking past each other.  Perhaps, 
then, the divide in Hobby Lobby is rooted in a more basic division among 
the Justices regarding the wisdom, and the appropriate contours, of the 
Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to religion. 
Indeed, one of the basic elements of the Supreme Court’s hands-off 
approach was established in the 1944 case United States v. Ballard,67 in 
which the Court held that judges have the authority to evaluate the sincerity 
of an adherent’s belief in a religious principle, but not to question the 
inherent truth or validity of that principle.68  On the grounds of this 
distinction, the majority affirmed a conviction of fraud, based on the factual 
conclusion that the defendants did not sincerely believe the truthfulness of 
the religious representations they made to others.69  At the same time, the 
 
 63  Id. 
 64  See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text. 
 65  Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States 
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982)). 
 66  See Adams & Barmore, supra note 29, at 59. 
 67  322 U.S. 78 (1944). 
 68  Id. at 86–88; see discussion supra note 29 and accompanying text.  
 69  Ballard, 322 U.S. at 83–84. 
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majority insisted that a court may not evaluate the inherent truth or falsity 
of a religious belief or doctrine.70 
Notably, Justice Jackson dissented in Ballard, rejecting the analytical 
distinction that would allow judicial inquiry into the sincerity of a religious 
belief while precluding the evaluation of the truth or accuracy of the 
belief.71  Instead, he argued that courts should likewise be prohibited from 
evaluating the sincerity of a religious belief, concluding that “I would 
dismiss the indictment and have done with this business of judicially 
examining other people’s faiths.”72 
Without citing Ballard—in fact, without resort to any citation—
Justice Ginsburg’s concluding remarks in the Hobby Lobby dissent, 
decrying judicial inquiry into religious sincerity, seem to echo Justice 
Jackson’s concerns and may constitute an attempt to revive his approach, in 
the face of more than seventy years of precedent to the contrary.  In this 
reading, Justice Ginsburg’s concerns about RFRA become more 
pronounced and, therefore, more understandable, and likewise, her 
rejection of other elements of the Court’s hands-off approach becomes 
more significant.  Moreover, this reading of Justice Ginsburg’s 
jurisprudence may also account for the stark divide between the majority 
and the dissent in Hobby Lobby. 
Ballard and its progeny established one of the safeguards against the 
unfettered reliance on religious claims as a defense to prosecution for 
otherwise illegal conduct, or as a basis for an exemption from an otherwise 
valid law.  Under Ballard, a court has the authority to inquire whether an 
individual is expressing a sincerely held religious belief.  If the court 
concludes that the individual is sincere, the claim will qualify as religious 
in nature for the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause or, more recently, 
RFRA and RLUIPA.  Alternatively, if the court concludes that the 
individual is insincere, the claim will not qualify as based in religion. 
Notwithstanding considerable merit to Justice Jackson’s argument, as 
a practical matter, his position would remove this safeguard and would 
permit any individual to conjure up and assert a religious justification for 
any form of otherwise illegal conduct.73  Coupled with other elements of 
the Court’s hands-off approach, which additionally preclude judicial 
inquiry into the validity or consistency of a religious claim, Justice 
Jackson’s position would then allow any individual to assert a claim of any 
belief, however insincere or farfetched, and have that claim qualify as 
religious in nature under the Free Exercise Clause, RFRA, or RLUIPA. 
 
 70  Id. at 86–88. 
 71  Id. at 92–93 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see Marshall, Religious Inquiry, supra note 3, 
at 254–55. 
 72  Ballard, 322 U.S. at 95 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 73  See supra note 28; see also Marshall, Religious Inquiry, supra note 3, at 254–57. 
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To the extent that Justice Ginsburg seems to have echoed and adopted 
Justice Jackson’s position, her concerns over an expansive application of 
RFRA are better understood and appreciated.  Under the terms of RFRA, a 
law that places a substantial burden on religion must be shown to constitute 
the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental 
interest.74  If any asserted religious claim must be accepted as sincere—as 
Justice Ginsburg seems to advocate—and if a court must accept the 
adherent’s characterization of a religious claim as a substantial burden on 
religion—as both the Hobby Lobby majority and Supreme Court precedent 
seem to require75—then any individual can challenge any law through the 
assertion that it poses a substantial burden on the exercise of religion.  
Once the claimant simply asserts a religious belief that directly contradicts 
the law, courts would be precluded from inquiring into the validity of the 
claim on the basis of evaluating either the sincerity or the accuracy of the 
claim. 
Of course, categorizing a claim as religious in nature, or subject to the 
RFRA balancing test, does not mean that the claim will necessarily 
succeed.  No court has ever suggested that a murder conviction would be 
overturned because of an assertion that laws against murder substantially 
burden a religious belief that requires committing murder.  Nevertheless, 
under the expansive protections of RFRA/RLUIPA, precluding judicial 
inquiry into both the sincerity of a religious claim and the characterization 
of the burden as substantial would place the government in a position of 
having to respond to any such assertions by demonstrating that the law was 
the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.  
Though laws against murder are an easy case, other laws and regulations, 
such as prison rules, zoning laws, and the ACA, would be closer calls.  
Indeed, Justice Ginsburg seems particularly wary of such a result, as 
illustrated by the parade of horribles she hypothesizes, representing 
scenarios that, she argues, would be difficult for courts to decide, and to 
decide appropriately, based on the majority’s analysis.76 
As Justice Ginsburg acknowledged, both the plaintiffs in Hobby 
Lobby and the majority of the Court were not troubled by the hypotheticals 
she raises.  In their views, each case would be considered under an 
individualized least restrictive/compelling interest test.77  Tellingly, Justice 
Ginsburg responded that “approving some religious claims while deeming 
others unworthy of accommodation could be ‘perceived as favoring one 
religion over another,’ the very ‘risk the Establishment Clause was 
 
 74  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (2012). 
 75  See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
 76  See supra note 61. 
 77  See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2805 (2014) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
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designed to preclude.’”78  Therefore, she concluded, “[t]he Court, I fear, 
has ventured into a minefield, by its immoderate reading of RFRA.”79  
Perhaps because Justice Ginsburg would eschew judicial consideration of 
religious sincerity, thereby removing one safeguard against overly broad 
religious protections, she would instead substitute a more limited 
application of RFRA through increased judicial inquiry into the asserted 
nature of the burden on religion. 
Justice Ginsburg’s critique of the majority leaves open a number of 
questions of its own.  Indeed, though Justice Ginsburg refers to the 
majority’s “immoderate reading of RFRA,”80 she does not explain 
precisely how a different reading of RFRA would affect the outcome in the 
hypotheticals she raises, or—more to the point—how any reading of RFRA 
would avoid the application of balancing tests that, depending on the facts 
of particular scenarios, might result in outcomes that favor some religions 
and not others. 
Ultimately, Justice Ginsburg seems to be advocating, in some ways, 
an even more robust and extensive form of the Court’s hand-off approach, 
one that would preclude these kinds of individualized and fact-specific 
considerations of religious claims.  Regardless of the possible appeal of 
Justice Ginsburg’s arguments, the more restricted form of religious 
freedoms that her analysis could produce may illustrate yet another 
potential problem presented by the hands-off approach. 
CONCLUSION 
In the past three terms, the United States Supreme Court has decided 
three important religious freedom cases that implicated, to different 
degrees, the Court’s hands-off approach to questions of religious practice 
and belief.  In the 2012 case, Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church 
& School v. EEOC,81 in a unanimous opinion authored by Chief Justice 
Roberts, the Court formally recognized the ministerial exception, holding 
that, “[b]oth Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the 
decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.”82  In the 2015 
case, Holt v. Hobbs,83 in another unanimous decision, this time authored by 
Justice Alito, the Court accepted an inmate’s characterizations of both his 
practice of religion and the burden that prison regulations would place on 
 
 78  Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment)). 
 79  Id. (citing Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(O’Scannlain, J., concurring)). 
 80  Id.  
 81  132 S. Ct. 694 (2012). 
 82  Id. at 702. 
 83  135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). 
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his religious exercise.84  Although the Justices reached unanimity in both of 
these cases, the opinions seemed to leave unanswered a number of difficult 
questions, likewise implicated by the hands-off approach, involving the 
precise contours of the ministerial exception85 and the extent to which 
prison officials must defer to inmates’ religious claims.86 
In notable contrast to the unanimity achieved in these cases, Burwell v. 
Hobby Lobby, Inc.,87 decided in the interim, proved highly contentious, 
prompting a sharply divided Court to issue starkly contrasting majority and 
dissenting opinions.  In further contrast to Hosanna-Tabor and Holt, in 
Hobby Lobby, the Justices took the opportunity to more fully explore the 
implications of the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to religion.  
Although the debates among the Justices in Hobby Lobby revolved around 
a number of controversial issues,88 the differences between the opinions of 
Justice Alito and Justice Ginsburg turned, in part, on important differences 
with respect to the hands-off approach.  Significantly, Hobby Lobby 
exposes some of the underlying fault lines and tensions among the Justices 
regarding the proper formulation and application of the hands-off approach 
to religion, raising additional concerns over the continued wisdom and 
viability of the Court’s current approach and demonstrating the need for 
further exploration and, perhaps, substantial reconsideration in the future. 
 
 84  See id. at 862–63. 
 85  See, e.g., Richard W. Garnett & John M. Robinson, Hosanna-Tabor, Religious 
Freedom, and the Constitutional Structure, 2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 307; Levine, 
Hosanna-Tabor, supra note 3; Christopher C. Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic 
and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183 (2014); Michael W. McConnell, 
Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821 (2012); Brian M. Murray, 
The Elephant in Hosanna-Tabor, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 493 (2012).  For more critical 
views of Hosanna-Tabor, see, for example, Frederick Mark Gedicks, Narrative Pluralism 
and Doctrinal Incoherence in Hosanna-Tabor, 64 MERCER L. REV. 405 (2013); Leslie C. 
Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981 (2013); Ioanna Tourkochoriti, 
Revisiting Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC: The Road Not Taken, 49 TULSA L. REV. 47 (2013). 
 86  See, e.g., Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2015); Sessing v. Beard, No. 
1:13-cv-01684-LJO-MJS (PC), 2015 WL 3953501 (E.D. Cal. June 29, 2015); see also Holt 
v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  For a more critical view, 
see, for example, Marci Hamilton, The Supreme Court’s New Ruling on the Religious Land 
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act’s Prison Provisions: Deferring Key Constitutional 
Questions, FINDLAW (June 2, 2005), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20050602.html. 
 87  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 88  See supra note 5. 
